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Libertas Praestantissimum by Pope Leo XIII

Pope Leo XIII (b. 2 March 1810 – d. 20 July 1903), born Gioacchino Vincenzo Raffaele Luigi Pecci, began his pontificate on 20 February 1878. His papacy is the fourth longest in the history of the Church. He is known for having composed the Prayer to Archangel St Michael and for the encyclical “Humanum Genus” on freemasonry published on 20 April 1884.


Related to modern errors regarding authority and freedom, the encyclical “Libertas Praestantissimum” published on 20 June 1888 is on the nature of human liberty. The document is approximately 10,000 words in 47 paragraphs.


Leo XIII begins with the obvious, that liberty is “the highest of natural endowments, being the portion only of intellectual or rational natures, confers on man this dignity”.

Man, indeed, is free to obey his reason, to seek moral good, and to strive unswervingly after his last end. Yet he is free also to turn aside to all other things; and, in pursuing the empty semblance of good, to disturb rightful order and to fall headlong into the destruction which he has voluntarily chosen. … Yet there are many who imagine that the Church is hostile to human liberty. Having a false and absurd notion as to what liberty is, either they pervert the very idea of freedom, or they extend it at their pleasure to many things in respect of which man cannot rightly be regarded as free.

As for man’s reasoning ability, “it is by his use of this [reason] that man is rightly regarded as responsible for his actions”. This is not mere instinct. The ability to reason is in the soul

…which is not produced by matter, and does not depend on matter for its existence; but which is created immediately by God, and, far surpassing the condition of things material, has a life and action of its own… When, therefore, it is established that man’s soul is immortal and endowed with reason and not bound up with things material, the foundation of natural liberty is at once most firmly laid.

In terms of action,

…the will cannot proceed to act until it is enlightened by the knowledge possessed by the intellect. In other words, the good wished by the will is necessarily good in so far as it is known by the intellect… No sensible man can doubt that judgment is an act of reason, not of the will. The end, or object, both of the rational will and of its liberty is that good only which is in conformity with reason.

Of course, given our fallen state, our abilities are not perfect. To the argument that God,  the angels and saints are not free because they cannot do evil, the inability to do evil is not the lack of freedom because that possibility is an imperfection. The pope cites St Thomas Aquinas, who makes the point that the possibility of sinning is not freedom, but slavery.


Leo XIII makes it clear that “there must be law”, that

…reason prescribes to the will what it should seek after or shun, in order to the eventual attainment of man’s last end, for the sake of which all his actions ought to be performed. This ordination of reason is called law. … Nothing more foolish can be uttered or conceived than the notion that, because man is free by nature, he is therefore exempt from law. Were this the case, it would follow that to become free we must be deprived of reason; whereas the truth is that we are bound to submit to law precisely because we are free by our very nature. For, law is the guide of man’s actions; it turns him toward good by its rewards, and deters him from evil by its punishments.

The first type of law mentioned is natural law, which is “written and engraved in the mind of every man”. As law is binding, it follows that it must come from a higher authority. Therefore, it is the “same thing as the eternal law” which is the “eternal reason of God”.


We need God’s divine grace to enlighten and strengthen our minds. Grace does not override free will. To paraphrase St Thomas Aquinas, it is the “safeguard of all natures, and to maintain the character, efficiency, and operations of each”.


Natural law can be applied to civil society but it is not the creator of nature. Some human laws are basically natural law, whilst others are its applications—natural law is the general whereas human laws are the particular.

For instance, though nature commands all to contribute to the public peace and prosperity, whatever belongs to the manner, and circumstances, and conditions under which such service is to be rendered must be determined by the wisdom of men and not by nature herself.

Ultimately, God’s eternal law is the “sole standard and rule” of human liberty individually and collectively. If every individual did as they please, it would ruin not merely the individual but society. This, of course, also extends to those who govern society.

Likewise, the liberty of those who are in authority does not consist in the power to lay unreasonable and capricious commands upon their subjects, which would equally be criminal and would lead to the ruin of the commonwealth; but the binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as applications of the eternal law, and incapable of sanctioning anything which is not contained in the eternal law, as in the principle of all law.

Authority comes from God but this does not exclude human authority structure and we have a duty to obey authority when it is just.

Lawful power is from God, “and whosoever resisteth authority resisteth the ordinance of God” [Romans 13:2]; wherefore, obedience is greatly ennobled when subjected to an authority which is the most just and supreme of all. But where the power to command is wanting, or where a law is enacted contrary to reason, or to the eternal law, or to some ordinance of God, obedience is unlawful, lest, while obeying man, we become disobedient to God.

Leo XIII then addresses those who reject authority under the guise of “liberty” as derived from humanism.

The fundamental doctrine of rationalism is the supremacy of the human reason, which, refusing due submission to the divine and eternal reason, proclaims its own independence, and constitutes itself the supreme principle and source and judge of truth. Hence, these followers of liberalism deny the existence of any divine authority to which obedience is due, and proclaim that every man is the law to himself; from which arises that ethical system which they style independent morality, and which, under the guise of liberty, exonerates man from any obedience to the commands of God, and substitutes a boundless license.

In other words, under this school of thought, people may do whatever they please. As a society, it is no longer bound by any principle and that, at best, “the law determining what it is right to do and avoid doing is at the mercy of a majority”. This leads to “tyranny” in which religion is treated with indifference and as a public institution is rejected. Sedition and revolution follow.


Of course, not every “liberal” is that extreme. Some admit God and the natural law whilst rejecting lower authority structures.

In this they are plainly inconsistent. For if—as they must admit, and no one can rightly deny—the will of the Divine Law-giver is to be obeyed, because every man is under the power of God, and tends toward Him as his end, it follows that no one can assign limits to His legislative authority without failing in the obedience which is due.

As for those who specifically reject “morality of the State” even though they accept “morality of individuals”, this is also inconsistent.

Hence follows the fatal theory of the need of separation between Church and State. But the absurdity of such a position is manifest. Nature herself proclaims the necessity of the State providing means and opportunities whereby the community may be enabled to live properly, that is to say, according to the laws of God. For, since God is the source of all goodness and justice, it is absolutely ridiculous that the State should pay no attention to these laws or render them abortive by contrary enactments.

Granted, the state operates differently from the Church and

…although the civil authority has not the same proximate end as the spiritual, nor proceeds on the same lines, nevertheless in the exercise of their separate powers they must occasionally meet. For their subjects are the same, and not infrequently they deal with the same objects, though in different ways.

At this point, Leo XIII examines liberty in terms of the “liberty of worship”, which is “that every man is free to profess as he may choose any religion or none”. One can, but man’s most important duty is to render worship to God. Therefore, it is important to practice the true religion as “no true virtue can exist without religion”.


When “liberty of worship” is applied to the State, it follows that the State is indifferent to God and what the people do.

But, to justify this, it must needs be taken as true that the State has no duties toward God, or that such duties, if they exist, can be abandoned with impunity, both of which assertions are manifestly false.

God has made man to be in the company of others so that what one lacks can be obtained from others and vice versa. Thus, society and the state must not be godless or indifferent to God.


As for “liberty of speech”, “liberty of the press” and “liberty of teaching”, one can say or publish or teach whatever one wants, but one should only say or publish whatever is true and honorable. As already mentioned, “right” is manipulated to mean “license”.

If unbridled license of speech and of writing be granted to all, nothing will remain sacred and inviolate… Thus, truth being gradually obscured by darkness, pernicious and manifold error, as too often happens, will easily prevail. Thus, too, license will gain what liberty loses; for liberty will ever be more free and secure in proportion as license is kept in fuller restraint. In regard, however, to all matter of opinion which God leaves to man’s free discussion, full liberty of thought and of speech is naturally within the right of everyone; for such liberty never leads men to suppress the truth, but often to discover it and make it known.

Some truths are only revealed by God, whom he entrusted to that society founded by Him; that is, the Church, “of which He is the head, and with which He has promised to abide till the end of the world”.


As for the apparent conflict between so-called science and religion, there should be none.

Now, reason itself clearly teaches that the truths of divine revelation and those of nature cannot really be opposed to one another, and that whatever is at variance with them must necessarily be false. Therefore, the divine teaching of the Church, so far from being an obstacle to the pursuit of learning and the progress of science, or in any way retarding the advance of civilization, in reality brings to them the sure guidance of shining light.

More generally and keeping in mind practical implications, evil may sometimes be tolerated “for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good”.

But, to judge aright, we must acknowledge that, the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further is it from perfection; and that the tolerance of evil which is dictated by political prudence should be strictly confined to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare, requires. Wherefore, if such tolerance would be injurious to the public welfare, and entail greater evils on the State, it would not be lawful; for in such case the motive of good is wanting.

As for “tolerance”, it is common that liberalists who promote that idea are often quite intolerant of the liberty that the Church should have.

But, in spite of all this show of tolerance, it very often happens that, while they profess themselves ready to lavish liberty on all in the greatest profusion, they are utterly intolerant toward the Catholic Church, by refusing to allow her the liberty of being herself free.

Leo XIII concludes the encyclical by repeating, amongst other things, the basic point that “any liberty, except that which consists in submission to God and in subjection to His will, is unintelligible”. This includes the state. There must be just cause in seeking to change government, such as a reasonable fear of “unjust oppression of the people on the one hand, or a deprivation of the liberty of the Church”. But the response must be in proportion.

In such case, an excessive and vicious liberty is not sought, but only some relief, for the common welfare, in order that, while license for evil is allowed by the State, the power of doing good may not be hindered.

Ultimately, the specific form of the government is not as important as its adherence to Catholic doctrine.

Again, it is not of itself wrong to prefer a democratic form of government, if only the Catholic doctrine be maintained as to the origin and exercise of power. Of the various forms of government, the Church does not reject any that are fitted to procure the welfare of the subject; she wishes only—and this nature itself requires—that they should be constituted without involving wrong to any one, and especially without violating the rights of the Church.

Pope Leo XIII (1878)
Pope Leo XIII (1878)

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